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ABSTRACT
To help meet the nation’s energy needs, recycling of partially used nuclear
fuel is being considered more and more as a necessary step in a future nuclear
fuel cycle, but incorporating this step into the fuel cycle will require considerable
investment. This report supports an ongoing evaluation of financing scenarios for
recycling facilities integrated into the nuclear fuel cycle. A range of options from
fully government owned to fully private owned were evaluated in FY-05 using a
deterministic analysis. In FY-06 this analysis is being extended by development
of an economic tool that captures the financing algorithms and supports the
decision analysis capabilities needed to effectively manage and exploit
uncertainty and complexity. The analysis performed in this report utilized DPL
(dynamic programming language 6.0), which can systematically optimize
outcomes based on user-defined criteria (e.g., lowest life-cycle cost, lowest unit
cost).
This evaluation concludes that the lowest unit costs and lifetime costs
follow a fully government-owned financing strategy, due to government
forgiveness of debt as sunk costs. However, this does not mean that the facilities
should necessarily be constructed and operated by the government. The costs for
hybrid combinations of public and private (commercial) financed options can
complete under some circumstances with the government option. This analysis
shows that commercial operations have potential to be economical, but there is
presently no incentive for private industry involvement, due to the current legal
framework of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which establishes government
ownership of partially used commercial nuclear fuel.
Overwhelmingly, uncertainty in annual facility capacity led to the greatest
variations in unit costs necessary for recovery of operating and capital
expenditures; the ability to determine annual capacity will be a driving factor in
setting unit costs. For private ventures, the costs of capital, especially equity
interest rates, dominate the balance sheet; and the annual operating costs,
forgiveness of debt and overnight costs dominate the government case. The
uncertainty in operations, leading to lower than optimal processing rates, is the
most detrimental issue economically. Conversely, lowering debt interest rates
and the required return on investments can reduce costs for private industry.
Additional studies on facility ownership will be researched and
incorporated into the 2006 AFC Cost Basis report. The authors are aware of
similar studies on MOX fuel fabrication facilities (ORNL 1996) for weapons
plutonium disposition. These studies showed that government ownership lead to
the lowest life cycle and unit costs. For the U.S. MOX Fabrication Facility, now
under construction at the Savannah River site, government funds are being used
for construction; however, a private company will operate the plant with
performance-based incentives. Also additional analysis will be performed to
better understand facility capacity cost sensitivities and other high cost impact
items.
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Financing Strategies for a Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility
1. INTRODUCTION
With the current heightened concern for air pollutants and natural resource conservation, there is a
focus on future energy options. One option is the resurgence of nuclear power with a new, closed fuel
cycle. Research in this area is being conducted within the framework of the advanced fuel cycle initiative
(AFCI). “A mission of the AFCI program is to develop technologies that concurrently will meet the need
for an economic and sustained nuclear option while satisfying requirements for a controlled, proliferation-
resistant nuclear material management system” (AFCI 2005).
Initial work on the economics of the private sector versus regulated nuclear fuel cycle facilities was
completed by Chaim Braun in 2005 and was reported in the 2005 Advanced Fuel Cycle Cost Basis,
Appendix D (Shropshire 2005). The purpose of this paper is to extend the single point economic analysis
performed by Chaim Braun to a probability and uncertainty analysis sphere. To support these advanced
calculations a dynamic model was created using dynamic programming language (DPL) Version 6.0
Professional. Scenarios were run to determine which factors were most influential in determining benefits
and costs, and then evaluated to develop a realistic range of values. With this range, both discrete value
and Monte Carlo simulations were run and the scenarios evaluated. This report discusses their merits and
attempts to understand the cost implications from facility ownership options: government, private, and
combinations of government/private.
1.1 BACKGROUND
There is little directly applicable research on the ownership options for a first-of-a-kind recycling
facility. Initial work performed by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) evaluated recycling facility
ownership options for a private company, a utility consortium, and the government (NAS 1996). The
NAS determined that “A pure, private venture to design, build, own, and operate such a complex, without
government financial guarantees, appears unrealistic.” Further, they conclude, “At a minimum, it would
appear that some new type of government risk/cost sharing, far more extensive than on past
projects/programs, would be necessary to attract utility participation.” A comparative analysis of a
generic fuel cycle facility was conducted by Braun for the AFCI Economic Benefits activity, analyzing
the unit costs for recycling under various ownership options with an ultimate conclusion that government
ownership led to lowest costs, especially if the government were willing to forgive debt. Braun also
explored qualitative differences in financing options, such as the national social benefit of such a facility
and government legal obligations to the utilities toward partially used fuel disposition. In addition, there
has been some comparative economic analysis done on public and private facilities in the past; however,
most of these are not wholly representative in this case, as the bulk of these analyses are based on the
electric generating industry power plants and carry assumptions not applicable here. Most useful for the
AFCI’s purposes is the historical evidence of private industry having lower operating costs compared to
similar government facilities (Kwoka 2005).
1.2 APPROACH
This analysis is designed to meet the needs of the AFCI program. To that end, we have considered
the required capacities and processes stated in the AFCI Report to Congress (AFCI 2005). The AFCI
program is considering advancements to the established PUREX process, such as UREX+ and
pyroprocessing as recycling technology options. The specific designs and methods for separation in a
future fuel recycle facility have not yet been determined. There is limited cost data available on new
recycle facility costs that would be applicable to a United States application. The AFCI program has
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compiled historical reports and studies on recycling, and has determined that there are very large cost
uncertainty ranges for these facilities.
The current plan does not anticipate large numbers of recycle facilities being built, so the relative
advantages coming from next-of-a-kind (Nth-of-a-kind or NOAK) facilities are ignored, and the financing
options are only considered for the first facility. Subsequent facilities, if built, will likely have similar
financing considerations as the first.
This model follows the conclusions drawn from independent review of the literature discussing
recycle facilities, especially those cited in Section 1.1, Background. For comparison, this model could
easily be modified to model other related facilities, such as those intended for fuel fabrication or
combined (integrated) recycling and refabrication. The ownership structure for facilities in mature
industries is not in doubt, but similar analyses may be necessary for other new processes that accompany
or complement the desire to recycle partially used nuclear fuel.
The model was set up from the variables and data from the AFCI’s previous work in FY-05. The
financing options were (a) totally government-constructed-and-operated facility, (b) a government-
constructed facility sold to a private sector corporation with a portion of initial investment forgiven, (c) a
private-sector regulated facility, and (d) private-sector non-regulated facility. This type of economic
model could be extended and easily modified to accommodate all facilities to be considered (e.g.,
separations, fabrication, storage, etc).
1.3 Assumptions
The major baseline financial assumptions underlying this analysis are provided in Tables 1 and 2.
These assumptions are consistent with the analysis of economics of the private sector versus regulated
nuclear fuel cycle facility reported in the 2005 AFC Cost Basis report, Appendix D (Shropshire, 2005).
All the computations carried out here relate to a hypothetical facility and do not represent any specific
plant design or cost data.
Table 1. Analysis major baseline assumptions.
Baseline values used in all four cases
Total capital charges (TCIC) $8.0 Billion
Annual operating costs (O&M) $396 Million/year
Annual capacity 800,000 MTHM/year)
Lifetime 30 Years
Table 2. Financial assumptions used in the model.
Government
Constructed
& Operated
Government
Constructed
& Sell Private
Regulated
Private
Nonregulated
Private
Debt portion (%) 100.0 40 50 30
Debt interest rate (%/yr) 4.0 4.8 4.8 9.0
Equity portion (%) 0 60 50 70
Required return on investment (%/yr) NA 10.5 8.5 16.0
Insurance (%/yr) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Federal taxes (%/yr) NA 33.0 33.0 33.0
State and local taxes (%/yr) (average) NA 5.0 5.0 5.0
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Forgiveness of Plant Investment (%) 100% 62.5%b NA NA
1.4 Considerations
Originally, return on investment (ROI) in the model was a calculated variable from other inputs,
but this setup did not allow direct comparison of government and private facilities. From these financial
assumptions, the ROI to private investors becomes fixed in the model at the required ROI (as shown in
Table 2). This may not be the real-world scenario, as investors may demand a higher ROI than suggested
here. Also, private companies may choose to allocate capital expenses differently among debt and equity
portions. There are some tax advantages to maximizing debt; however, there has not been the tendency of
corporations to simply maximize debt, because there are other advantages to having equity financing.
To meet the needs of a new generation of nuclear power plants, the first commercial-scale
recycling facility would be employed by the year 2025, with a capacity of 2,500 to 3,000 MT/year and a
design life of 40 years (AFCI 2005). Further, AFCI is also considering 3,000 MT/ year facilities with a
lifetime of 60 years; these are not modeled here. These capacities suggest significant deviations from the
currently available data on other existing recycle facilities and estimates of future scenarios. The existing
technology (PUREX) is used at both La Hague (2 with 800 MT/yr each) and THORP (1,200 MT/yr).
This analysis uses the 800 MT/yr as a baseline capacity for comparison. We investigate the implications
from increasing this capacity to those under consideration by the AFCI Program.
From a systems perspective, to achieve the lowest nuclear energy costs we have to sharpen our
pencils to find ways to reduce the cost for fuel recycling. In seeking the lowest cost options we have to
consider the impacts from recycling from various perspectives. One perspective is that of the utility that
would need to accept recycled fuel for use in their reactors. Another perspective is that of a waste
manager that would need to disposition costs of the recycled streams (i.e., placement into acceptable
waste forms, packaging, transportation, and disposal). The focus of this report is on optimizing the
facility costs, but the AFCI program is also evaluating the recycling costs from the other perspectives.
Additionally, recycling costs need to be compared against other fuel processing and technology costs, and
with competing energy costs when determining energy strategies.
b Of the debt, 62.5% is considered forgiven by the government. The private owner then distributes capital
portions over only the 37.5% of the initial capital investment made by the government.
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2.1 Construction
The construction costs have not been broken down into specifics, but the model has the flexibility
to do so. The construction section of the model calculates the overnight costs plus a contingency. The
contingency rate is based on historical experience and design maturity. The relationship between the
contingency and annual capital costs is explained in Section 2.3, Financing. Initially the contingency costs
are set at zero.
2.2 Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
The O&M costs are structured the same as the construction costs, with a central O&M cost defined,
and then a percentage contingency (based on historical experience and/or design maturity) is added to
arrive at annual O&M costs. The O&M costs were defined at a fixed rate of $396M/year for all four
scenarios.
2.3 Financing
The financing portion of the model is more complex, and supports the most important aspect of the
model. From “financing strategy” (yellow decision box in Figure 1), the model adjusts: the portion of
debt carried by the government, private interest rate, chosen ROI, and private debt fraction. These
variables are adjusted to meet the various scenarios in the table shown above in Section 1.3, Assumptions.
Using these values, the model calculates the fixed charge rate (FCR), Equation (1), for each option.
Detailed explanations of calculations can be found in financing textbooks and the Cost Basis report
(Shropshire, 2005).
FCR = ((1−Tax)^ −1)*((Equity Fraction*CRFequity) − Tax/Lifetime
+ (Debt Fraction*(CRFdebt − Int/Tax)). (1)
The annual capital charge is simply the TCIC multiplied by the FCR.
Annual Capital Costs = TCIC * FCR (2)
Total annual costs include the annual capital costs plus the annual O&M costs. These will
necessarily vary by ownership option.
2.4 Production
The production section consists of the annual throughput and contingency on capacity. This
contingency is calculated as a percentage decrement from given capacity. Initially the contingency is set
to zero.
Unit costs are determined by ensuring that all annual costs are met with the proceeds from the
throughput:
Unit Cost = Total Annual Costs ÷ Annual Capacity. (3)
2.5 Evaluation of Major Uncertainties
Before we can begin modeling this problem, we must determine which variables will offer
significant change to the end result, unit cost. In DPL, the sensitivity of each variable is determined by
creating a tornado diagram. The variables for the baseline government constructed & operated option
were run over a range of potential values as noted on the value tornado diagram in Figure 2. Only those
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variables that had a significant effect on the value of the estimated unit costs were included in this
analysis.
Figure 2. Tornado diagram showing the effect of uncertainty on unit costs.
Clearly, annual capacity is the most dominant variable on the calculated unit cost. If high
capacities (approaching 3,000 MT/year) are obtained within the same capital and operation cost
parameters as modeled, then unit costs as low as $500/kgHM could be achieved. These capacities could
result from significant economies of scale (specifically capital cost versus capacity) arising from the
construction design and facility operations designed for optimal economic throughput.
Reduction of overnight costs can also directly improve the costs for reprocessing. A reduction of
the overnight costs by 50% has an impact of reducing the unit costs by a third. Annual operations and
maintenance favors operation by the government or government/private sector over the higher costs
expected from a regulated facility. Government forgiveness of the original investment can result in a unit
cost reduction of up to 25%, for a government facility that claims 100% sunk cost. The lifetime of the
facility has about a 5% impact on the unit costs, but in combination with higher facility capacities could
help to defer the need for additional recycle plants.
Now that we understand the effect of changing values one-at-a-time, we can add uncertainty to the
variables and run the model in the form of a multivariable sensitivity study. Uncertainty has been added to
the model by assigning values in the forms of normal curves with a mean at the nominal value and a
standard deviation of 10%. This results in 99.73% of possible input values falling into the range of three
standard deviations on either side of the nominal value. Those variables that have added uncertainty are
shown in the diagram above. One exception to the normal curve is lifetime. The lifetime could vary
substantially from the 30 year assumption, so the uncertainty in lifetime is modeled by a uniform
probability from 20 to 60 years. Also, the amount of debt incurred by the government which is forgiven
is assumed to be 100%, except in the case where it is modeled that the government does not forgive (or
sink) debt.
December 16, 2005
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These uncertainties are added to the model by changing the input variable into a continuous chance
(stochastic) node. Continuous chance nodes are shown as green ovals in the model. Constant input
variables and calculations are shown by blue rectangles in Figure 1.
The way the DPL program runs through the scenarios is depicted by the decision tree in Figure 3. The
decision tree shows the flow through the model to determine the outcomes. The model will run through
each of the four financing options with 1 million cases; each case will go through the decision tree, so we
actually run 4 million cases each time we do an analysis on this model. The case will stop at each
continuous chance node, where the model will “roll the dice” (Monte Carlo simulation) to determine a
value for that parameter; then the model will continue until the desired value for comparison is reached.
In this case, the objective function is unit costs, which is evaluated and then compared across the
financing scenarios.
normal
Unit_Costs
normal
Annual
OMSub
uniform
Overnight
Costs
Government
Gov to Private
Regulated
Private
Lifetime
Financing
Strategy
Figure 3. DPL decision tree.
As a result of the simulation, the expected values for each of the financing strategies are displayed.
The financing strategy with the lowest unit cost is identified in the bolded top line of Figure 4. In this
example the government option returned the lowest unit cost at $550/kgHM, based on the uncertainty
values used in this run. As various assumptions are tested and the uncertainty distributions modified (as
we have done in the subsequent analysis in this report) the expected values will change and the lowest
cost financing strategy can shift between strategies. The results of the simulation lead us toward
identifying the best financing option under complex circumstances.
550.000
[550.000]Government
1013.952
[1013.952]Gov to Private
1494.912
[1494.912]Regulated
2650.538
[2650.538]Private
Financing Strategy
[550.000]
Figure 4. Example results from DPL simulation.
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3. RESULTS
With this setup, the model was run to see the range of unit costs and the relationship between the
financing strategies. For clarification, these simulations are all run under the assumptions documented in
the previous section, except where explicitly noted. From Figure 5, we can see that there is a large
distribution of costs from the low of nearly $500/kgHM to around $2600/kgHM.
Estimated Unit Costs ($/kgHM)
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
Government
Gov_to_Private
Regulated
Private
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
Figure 5. Estimated unit costs for each financing strategy.
The government option provides the lowest estimated unit cost distribution. By decreasing the
government involvement, the options become progressively more expensive. The regulated option is more
attractive than private ownership, even though none of the debt is forgiven. The private (non-regulated)
option is clearly the most expensive option.
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Estimated Lifetime Costs ($M)
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
Government
Gov_to_Private
Regulated
Private
0%
0.25%
0.5%
0.75%
1%
1.25%
1.5%
1.75%
2%
2.25%
2.5%
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000 160000
Figure 6. Lifetime costs in the nominal case.
Figure 6 shows a broad and overlapping range of estimated lifetime costs across the options
(representing 20 to 60 years of operation). All costs are considered recovered, as the unit costs are set by
the facility costs. The government option results in the lowest costs primarily due to the forgiven debt of
$8 billion, and the government-to-private option is the next least cost, as 62.5% of the initial investment is
forgiven and not recovered from the sales of services.
3.1 What if the government doesn’t forgive the debt?
The public is more likely to support a project that will minimize government-sunk money.
Historically, it has been the practice of the U.S. Government to forgive its own debt when building
facilities that are for the public good. Politically, the term public good varies in definition by users; so,
what is a public good for some may be a waste to others. For these reasons we consider cases that
minimize government-sunk money by repaying the debt over the facility’s lifetime.
In this simulation, only the wholly government option is changed, to reflect the option that the
government could choose to not forgive the debt. When debt is not forgiven, the government cost
advantage is significantly diminished over the course of the lifetime of the facility, as shown in Figures 7
and 8. In this case, the government is assumed to still forgive 62.5% of the debt when transferred to the
private sector, which results in reduced costs to the taxpayers. This change results in the government-to-
the-private option becoming slightly less expensive than the wholly government option.
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Estimated Unit Costs ($/kgHM)
Pr
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Government
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Private
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0.5%
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1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
Figure 7. Estimated unit costs in the government-not-forgiving-debt simulation.
Estimated Lifetime Costs ($M)
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o
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bi
lit
y
Government
Gov_to_Private
Regulated
Private
0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1%
1.2%
1.4%
1.6%
20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000 160000
Figure 8. Estimated lifetime costs in government-not-forgiving-debt simulation.
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3.2 What if operational problems cause the capacity to become
less than nominal?
For this question, the simulation runs with the annual capacity at 30-70% (240,000 – 560,000
kgHM/year) of the nominal design capacity as a uniform distribution of probability.
The recycling facility may run at lower than the nominal design capacity as a first-of-a-kind
facility. Lowering the annual capacity leads to higher unit costs, as should be expected (Figure 9). What
might not have been expected is the shape of the new probability distribution graphs. The ranges are
much broader, compared to the nominal values, and there is more uncertainty associated with the higher
costs in the ranges. An interesting result of this analysis is the asymmetric distribution of the cost curve
when the capacity is reduced. The left side of the distribution corresponds to the 70% value (560,000
kgHM/year) of the capacity reduction and the 30% (240,000 kgHM/year) value results in the long
distribution tail to the right. The asymmetric cost distribution pattern is derived from the ratio of the fixed
(capital recovery) costs to the variable (production) costs for this case.
From Section 2, we learned that the capacity variable has high cost sensitivity. From the tornado
diagram in Figure 2, we see that by halving the facility capacity to 400,000 kgHM/year the unit costs
double (an increase in unit costs of ~$1193/kgHM). Conversely if the capacity is doubled to 1,600,000
kgHM/year, then the unit costs are reduced by 50% (a decrease in unit costs of ~$636/kgHM). In other
words, the costs are more sensitive to capacity decreases than capacity increases.
Estimated Unit Costs ($/kgHM)
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
Government
Gov_to_Private
Regulated
Private
0%
0.5%
1%
1.5%
2%
2.5%
3%
3.5%
4%
4.5%
5%
5.5%
6%
6.5%
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Figure 9. Estimated unit costs in 30–70% annual capacity simulation.
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Estimated Lifetime Costs ($M)
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Gov_to_Private
Regulated
Private
0%
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0.75%
1%
1.25%
1.5%
1.75%
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2.25%
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2.75%
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000
Figure 10. Estimated lifetime costs in 30—70% annual capacity simulation.
Figure 10 shows an unremarkable result, as the lifetime costs are the same as in the nominal case.
This is not necessarily a realistic result, but it follows since the model capital costs and operating costs are
derived independent of actual capacity. Were a facility to operate at lower than nominal capacity in the
real world, it is not expected that they would have the foresight to exactly recover their costs as modeled
here. While the lifetime costs remain unchanged in this result, the overall efficiency of the facility is far
lower.
3.3 What if guaranteed contracts or government incentives
lead to lower risk for private investors?
To run a simulation of lower risk, the debt interest rate and required return on investment were
lowered for private investing to 6 and 10%, respectively. We assume that lowering the risk will bring
private ownership closer to the results from regulated ownership. Simulating lower risk is consistent with
many proposed legislation ideas to reduce risks for capital intensive energy industry components. At the
moment, recycle facilities are not considered in the legislation, but it is possible that the incentives put
into place for energy producing facilities might spill over into other types of facilities that support the
U.S. energy infrastructure.
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Estimated Unit Costs ($/kgHM)
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o
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Figure 11. Estimated unit costs in lower risk simulation.
The reduced-risk to the private sector scenario, shown in Figure 11, leads to the private option
having improved certainty and lower unit costs. The government-to-private option also has slight
improvements in certainty and costs due to the reduction of 0.5% of the ROI for the equity financing
received.
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Estimated Lifetime Costs ($M)
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Figure 12. Estimated lifetime costs in the lower risk simulation.
The lifetime cost result in Figure 12 is similar to the unit cost result in Figure 11, with the non-
regulated option moving noticeably and the government-to-private moving slightly to the left (decreasing
costs). The differences in their movements are due to the original assumptions which already benefited
the government-to-private option with a debt interest rate of 4% and equity ROI of 10.5%. Therefore the
government-to-private scenario only gains 0.5% on the equity portion of its 32.5% of debt, which results
in a very small change in the resulting cost. However the private option benefits by the reduction of the
debt interest rate from 9% to 6% and equity ROI from 16% to 10%.
3.4 How does this analysis incorporating elements of variable
uncertainty compare to the original AFCI deterministic
analysis?
In comparison between the original recycling facility financing study prepared in FY-05 and this
analysis, we have begun to identify a range of options that could result in lower recycle facility costs.
Most importantly, we have shown the importance of operating capacity and uncertainty in determining
unit and lifetime costs. We have also shown the limitations of the deterministic approach for selecting
financing alternatives, and the value of understanding cost uncertainty. We have brought focus to the
advantages from economies of scale from producing higher capacity facilities, where the largest portion
of the cost is in the facility construction.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
The most consistent result from these studies is that government ownership leads to lowest costs.
However, this does not mean that the facilities should necessarily be constructed and operated by the
government. Through this analysis we found that the costs of the government–to-private and the private
(regulated) options were not greatly different than the fully government option. This analysis indicates
that commercial operations have potential to be economical, but there is presently no incentive for private
industry involvement, since the current legal framework establishes government ownership of partially
used fuel (OCRWM/DOE 2004).
We have come to similar conclusions regarding the significance of cost variables as does the AFCI
2005 study prepared by Chaim Braun. In the government ownership option; annual O&M costs,
forgiveness of debt and overnight costs are the most significant. In the regulated and private cases, initial
capital costs will be most significant. Further, we have established that uncertainty in variables has a
greater effect on the private ownership option than the others.
Uncertainty in operation, leading to lower annual capacity, is the most detrimental scenario
economically. Determining the facilities throughput will be a driving factor in setting unit costs. There is
a significant penalty for operating at less than capacity, as shown by the 30 to 70% nominal annual
capacity simulation. With appreciable economies for full-capacity facility operation, the facility should
be designed for maximum throughput and availability to support the needs of the nuclear power plant
fleet. If high capacities (approaching 3,000 MT/year) are obtained within the same capital and operation
cost parameters as modeled, then unit costs as low as $500/kgHM could be achieved. These capacities
could result from significant economies of scale (specifically capital cost versus capacity) arising from the
construction design and facility operations designed for optimal economic throughput.
Mitigating risks, thereby lowering debt interest rates and required return on investments, led to the
most promising result for private industry initiative. Most of the costs for the private ventures are found in
the interest on debt and equity for the initial capital investment. Any mechanism causing the capital
investment and the associated returns to decrease will lead to a more attractive situation for private
ownership.
Additional studies on facility ownership will be researched and incorporated into this draft for the
2006 AFC Cost Basis report. The authors are aware of similar studies on MOX fuel fabrication facilities
(ORNL 1996) for weapons plutonium disposition. These studies showed that government ownership lead
to the lowest life cycle and unit costs. For the U.S. MOX Fabrication Facility, now under construction at
the Savannah River site, government funds are being used for construction; however, a private company
will operate the plant with performance-based incentives. Also additional analysis will be performed to
better understand facility capacity cost sensitivities and other high cost impact items.
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